

## Review of International Best Practice and Reform Directions

### 1. The Problem in Context

Australians with disability experience an unemployment rate approximately twice that of people without disability, a gap that has remained stubbornly persistent across successive program cycles (AIHW, 2025; Lawrence et al., 2026). Across 32 OECD countries, the employment rate of people with disability was reported as being 27 percentage points lower than for people without disability in 2022, with the gap not having shifted over the previous decade (OECD, 2022). People with disability want to work, can work, and bring demonstrated capability across every skill level and industry. While both supply-side and demand-side factors contribute to the gap, the international evidence increasingly points to demand-side constraints as the central problem: the systems, incentives, and relationships needed to connect employers confidently with people with disability have not yet been built at the scale required.

Australia's program structure and governance remain heavily oriented toward preparing job seekers for employment rather than transforming employer behaviour and workplace conditions. The new Inclusive Employment Australia (IEA) program, which replaced Disability Employment Services on 1 November 2025, introduces meaningful improvements, tiered support, removal of time limits, broader eligibility, and expanded wage subsidy arrangements (DSS, 2025a). Whether it constitutes a fundamental shift in demand-side architecture will depend on whether IEA providers are adequately resourced and expected to invest in employer capability, not just job placement.

### 2. The Economic and Workforce Case

This paper proposes that disability employment reform directed towards increasing employer demand, can be more persuasive when framed as workforce strategy rather than social obligation.

Australia faces intersecting labour market pressures, an ageing workforce, growing skills shortages, and an underutilised labour supply, that make the disability employment pipeline increasingly relevant on purely commercial grounds. Employer engagement literature consistently finds that business-case framing (emphasising productivity, retention and workforce strategy) is more effective than compliance-based approaches in motivating employer action (Bonaccio et al., 2020; Nagtegaal et al., 2023; van Berkel, 2025).

A systematic review by Bonaccio et al. (2020) found that across studies examining accommodation outcomes, positive results were reported in the majority of cases, including improved retention (89% of studies), productivity (72%), and attendance (56%). These figures reflect the proportion of studies reporting positive outcomes across heterogeneous research populations, rather than absolute effectiveness rates, but the direction and consistency of findings is clear. A European synthesis of 27 quantitative studies found that organisational inclusion practices produced measurable improvements in employee performance, well-being, and sustainable employment across disability types (van Berkel & Breit, 2026). Employers without good information consistently overestimate adjustment costs and underestimate the cost of replacing workers. Reframing workplace adjustment funding as a productivity investment rather than a compliance cost is therefore more likely to generate durable employer engagement than legal obligation alone.

### 3. What the International Evidence Shows

#### 3.1 Building employer capability through intermediaries

A consistent finding across the international literature is that employer reluctance to hire people with disability is driven less by prejudice than by perceived operational risk, namely uncertainty about productivity, costs, legal obligations, and management complexity (Nagtegaal et al., 2023). Systems that most effectively reduce this risk fund intermediaries not merely to place job seekers, but to serve both the worker and the employer: coaching supervisors, facilitating workplace adjustments, providing job carving expertise, and building lasting employer capability. Where providers are funded primarily as placement agencies, employer relationships remain transactional; where they are funded to understand and address operational risk, they become trusted partners (OECD, 2022).

Evidence of this intermediary function exists across several OECD countries, though each faces distinct constraints. In the Netherlands, subsidised job coaches are available to every unemployed person with disability under the *2015 Participation Act*, but access is fragmented across municipalities and analysts have noted limited substantive investment in human capital development beyond placement (Peijen et al., 2022; van Ooijen et al., 2024). Denmark's strength lies in its flexicurity model and Flexi-job wage subsidy scheme which has produced measurable employment gains for people with partial work capacity; however, its job centres have been criticised for a lack of strategic focus on disabled job seekers specifically, and outcomes vary significantly by age and disability severity (Scottish Government, 2025). Canada operates a network of supported employment agencies providing job coaching and employer engagement, with programs such as Ready, Willing and Able reaching thousands of employers, but faces challenges given implementation is heterogeneous across provinces and the system lacks national consistency (Government of Canada, 2025).

Australia's IEA providers already hold established relationships with thousands of employers. These relationships are an underutilised asset. With appropriate resourcing and clearer expectations, providers could actively build employer capability over time, making disability employment sustainable rather than episodic. The Centre for Inclusive Employment (CIE), established in 2025 with \$23.3 million over four years, has an important role in translating international evidence into practical guidance for providers (DSS, 2025b). Its value will ultimately depend on whether its resources change provider behaviour on the ground, and whether providers are appropriately resourced to do the intensive work of building employer capability over time.

### **3.2 Wage subsidies and workplace adjustment funding**

Evidence suggests wage subsidies work best when they are sufficient to offset real employer costs, simple to access, and linked to ongoing in-employment support rather than offered as standalone instruments (Clayton et al., 2011; Derbyshire et al., 2024). Australia's IEA wage subsidy of up to \$10,000 per participant and the Employment Assistance Fund (EAF), which reimburse workplace modifications up to approximately \$67,000 for premises-based modifications (JobAccess, 2025), together represent a reasonable financial foundation. However, EAF uptake among SME employers arguably remains low. Research consistently finds that smaller employers lack the human resources (HR) capacity to navigate available schemes and significantly underestimate adjustment costs, with a 2023 JobAccess national survey finding 60% of Australians unaware that workplace adjustments exist (JobAccess, 2023; Nagtegaal et al., 2023; Keating et al., 2023). The EAF's reimbursement-after-purchase model (which requires employers to outlay costs before recouping them) also arguably creates an additional cashflow barrier, which is particularly acute for smaller businesses.

Overseas, the United Kingdom's (UK) Access to Work scheme, the longest-running workplace adjustment program in the OECD, is instructive. It has been described as 'the best kept secret in the Department for Work and Pensions,' (Employment Related Services Association, 2014), and for many years has remained underused by SMEs because they lack the HR infrastructure to find and navigate it, and payment delays create cashflow problems that disproportionately affect smaller businesses (National Audit Office, 2026), raising genuine questions regarding its 'value for money'.

### **3.3 Accreditation and voluntary schemes**

The evidence on voluntary accreditation schemes is sobering. Research on the UK's Two Ticks scheme and its successor Disability Confident consistently finds that certified employers are no more likely to

employ people with disability than non-certified employers, and disabled employees in certified organisations report no better workplace experiences (Hoque et al., 2024). The central design failure is the absence of external validation and enforcement: both schemes relied on self-assessment with no independent inspection, creating a reputational signal with no performance obligation attached (Hoque et al., 2024; Welsh Government, 2025). Accreditation schemes are more likely to drive outcomes when linked to procurement advantage, subject to external validation at higher levels, and tied to meaningful performance reporting, design features that existing schemes have largely not implemented to date (Department for Work and Pensions, 2025).

### **3.4 What the evidence suggests does not work at scale**

Mandatory quota systems, while increasing participation at the margins, consistently fall short of target levels without strong enforcement and do not in themselves change workplace culture (Fuchs, 2014; Krekó et al., 2025). Further, anti-discrimination legislation establishes legal rights but does not, on its own, change employer capability or behaviour in practice. A systematic review of employer-focused interventions across OECD countries found that anti-discrimination legislation has no measurable effect on disability employment rates, with certified employers no more likely to hire people with disability than non-certified counterparts (Derbyshire et al., 2024). Clayton et al. (2011) reached the same conclusion examining the UK Disability Discrimination Act specifically, employment rates among people with disability were at their lowest in the period following the Act's implementation. Wage subsidies similarly produce mixed outcomes when poorly designed: schemes that are insufficiently funded, time-limited without transition support, or disconnected from ongoing workplace coaching are consistently associated with weaker employment retention and higher rates of locking participants into subsidised rather than open employment (Clayton et al., 2011; OECD, 2022a). Therefore, this evidence suggests that time-limited pilot programs, however promising their individual outcomes, are unlikely to produce durable system change without formal governance structures, public accountability mechanisms, and industry co-investment that can survive the funding cycle.

## **4. A Coherent Reform Strategy for Australia**

The following five reform directions emerge from the evidence. They are mutually reinforcing, building outward from demonstrated government leadership through deepened provider and sector relationships into commercial incentives and simplified access for the broader economy. Most build on existing infrastructure rather than requiring it to be rebuilt from scratch, though implementing all five simultaneously would require additional resourcing and political prioritisation as preconditions for success.

### **4.1 Government as the first employer of choice**

The most credible starting point for any employer engagement strategy is government itself. The Australian Public Service (APS) Disability Employment Strategy 2020-25 set a 7% disability representation target. As at 30 June 2025, 5.8% of APS employees shared their disability status in formal HR systems; and in the 2025 APS Employee Census, 12.5% of respondents self-identified as having a disability, the discrepancy between these two reports being 6.7% (APSC, 2025). While the gap between anonymous census disclosure is reducing (11.7% in 2024) and formal HR disclosure slightly increased (5.7% in 2024), the ongoing gap suggests a workplace culture in which employees do not yet feel safe identifying as having a disability, a cultural issue that targets alone cannot resolve (APSC, 2024). Norway's experience with its Inclusion Dugnad<sup>1</sup> (2018) is instructive: a 5% soft quota for state employers produced minimal impact because most agencies adopted passive rather than proactive recruitment approaches, and the initiative was not renewed after 2021 (Vale, 2025). The evidence therefore suggests a target is necessary, but not sufficient. What closes the gap is proactive recruitment, visible executive accountability, and an APS culture in which disability disclosure is genuinely safe.

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<sup>1</sup> 'Dugnad' refers to Norway's tradition of voluntary collective effort, often linked to community work, signalling here a shared responsibility for inclusion.

Beyond the APS, Australia's federated funding system provides an underutilised lever. National Partnership Agreements (NPA) have attached conditions to state behaviour in health, education, and housing. The same mechanism has not previously been applied to disability employment targets for state public sector employers, despite states being among the largest employers in Australia. Extending this lever so that state governments are held accountable for their own public sector disability employment performance as a condition of federally funded employment program participation, is an untested reform proposal, but one that existing NPAs could accommodate without requiring new legislation.

*Closing the APS disability employment gap matters not only on its own terms but also for the credibility of any broader private sector engagement strategy. The National Partnership Agreement mechanism offers an underexplored path to bringing state governments into the accountability framework alongside the Commonwealth.*

## 4.2 Harnessing IEA provider relationships to build employer capability

IEA providers already have established relationships with thousands of employers across Australia. The reform opportunity is to invest in and resource these relationships so they go beyond transactional placement toward genuine employer capability building. This means providers having adequate funding and time to coach supervisors, support workplace adjustment processes, provide job carving expertise, and help employers develop the internal knowledge and confidence to sustain disability employment over time, not just fill a vacancy.

Job coaching that serves both the worker and the employer is among the most consistently supported interventions in the international evidence (Peijen et al., 2022). Co-designed job carving and customised employment (ie., restructuring roles to match individual capabilities through a process of employer negotiation and worker discovery) shows growing evidence of improved employment outcomes compared to standard placement approaches. Randomised controlled trials in the United States and Spain found participants in customised employment significantly more likely to secure competitive integrated employment than those receiving treatment-as-usual, with sustained employment indicators including hours worked (Inge, et al., 2024; Martínez-Tur et al., 2025). The evidence base remains developing, and while customised employment has not yet met all criteria for classification as a fully evidence-based vocational rehabilitation practice, the direction of findings across multiple study designs is consistent and the approach is increasingly adopted in Australian practice (Christianson-Barker et al., 2025; Smith, 2023)."

Under the current model, CIE is mandated to develop guidance on these approaches; the question is whether IEA provider contracts are structured to enable and resource their application in practice, and whether the system is able to deliver long term market stability that Australia's current employment services procurement processes do not reliably provide. The employer relationships that underpin genuine capability building are built on trust, and trust takes time, being accumulated through repeated, consistent contact between a known provider and an employer, not through a single transaction. Research on employer engagement with employment services in Australia finds that longitudinal studies show providers have progressively reduced their contact with employers over time, and that outcome-based funding contracts driven by placement targets actively undermine the sustained relationships needed for genuine employer capability building (Ingold et al., 2023). The OECD similarly finds that contracted provider markets produce teething problems at each reset, with placement rates only improving in subsequent contract periods as providers rebuild operational capacity and employer relationships from scratch (OECD, 2022b). Where a significant share of the provider market changes at each tender (as occurred in the 2022 Workforce Australia, and 2025 IEA tender results) the employer relationships, trust, and accumulated local knowledge built over years are disrupted or lost entirely. The policy question is not only whether IEA provider contracts are structured to enable capability building, but whether the contracting model itself, with its competitive retendering, market churn, and placement-volume incentives, is compatible with the sustained employer partnerships that the evidence shows are essential for durable disability employment outcomes.

*IEA providers are an underutilised employer engagement asset. Resourcing them to build employer capability, through job coaching, job carving, and supervisor support, rather than focusing narrowly on placement volume, is likely to produce more sustainable employment outcomes for both employers and workers.*

### 4.3 Fostering durable sector-based employer partnerships

The Career Pathways Pilot (2023-25), involving Coles, Woolworths, Kmart, Target, and Compass Group, demonstrated that when major employers co-design employment pathways rather than simply receive referrals, meaningful career progression outcomes are achievable. According to Australian Disability Network's own reporting, which although it has not yet been independently evaluated, suggested 65% of Kmart and Target participants achieved promotions, permanent roles, or leadership training through the program (Australian Disability Network, 2025). The Disability Employment Tourism Local Navigators Pilot similarly tested sector-specific intermediary approaches in the visitor economy. Both are promising proof-of-concept models. However neither was established with the formal governance structures, public target reporting, or long-term funding commitments that would constitute a genuine sector compact.

Canada's Sectoral Workforce Solutions Program, which according to government reporting supported approximately 4,542 employers in 2024-25 with sector-specific training and employer engagement (Government of Canada, 2025), and Denmark's formal involvement of employer organisations in local employment decision-making (Scottish Government, 2025) both suggest that sector-based models work best when government, industry peak bodies, and major employers share accountability for outcomes within a durable governance structure. If Australia were to develop more formal programs at scale, it is suggested that they should target priority sectors where employer willingness and job volume already exist, such as in retail, logistics, aged care, hospitality, and technology.

*Australia has the sector pilot proof-of-concept. The next step is exploring what it would take to convert time-limited pilots into durable compacts, with formal governance, public reporting, industry co-investment, and IEA provider integration, in sectors where traction already exists.*

### 4.4 Social procurement as a disability employment lever

Government purchasing power is one of the most significant and often underutilised employer engagement levers available.

The UK's Cabinet Office Procurement Policy Note (PPN) 06/20 (mandatory from 1 January 2021) required central government departments to formally score social value in procurement, with a minimum 10% weighting in bid evaluation across five priority themes, including 'equal opportunity,' under which disability employment sits as an eligible outcome (Cabinet Office, 2020). Under the UK *Procurement Act 2023*, this framework was strengthened through the National Procurement Policy Statement and a new PPN 002, both effective from February 2025, which retained the minimum 10% weighting and added a requirement that supplier social value commitments be embedded as contract terms or key performance indicators, extending social value accountability across the full contract lifecycle (Cabinet Office, 2025).

In Australia, Victoria's Social Procurement Framework establishes 'Opportunities for Victorians with disability' as one of seven named social procurement objectives, applying across all government procurement activities. For contracts above \$20 million, agencies are required to set supplier targets for disability employment and training as contractual commitments; for lower-value contracts, agencies must seek information from suppliers on disability employment practices, with a mandatory social procurement evaluation criterion carrying a minimum 5% weighting in higher-value tender assessments (Department of Government Services, 2023). South Australia's Industry Participation Policy requires a minimum 15% weighting for industry participation criteria in all contracts above \$220,000, with economic benefit assessed across employment of South Australian residents, local supply chains, and support for disadvantaged groups, providing a mechanism through which disability employment can be scored, though it is not a specifically mandated criterion (Office of the Industry Advocate, 2023).

A national social procurement framework applied to Commonwealth contracts, with specific measurable disability employment obligations, supply chain requirements, independent verification, and evaluation weighting in tender scoring, could create genuine commercial incentives for disability employment at a scale voluntary programs struggle to reach. Procurement-linked accreditation, where employer certification carries a tangible tender advantage, could further amplify this effect. Design safeguards are essential: target gaming, subcontracting dilution, concentration in low-paid roles, and reporting inflation are all documented risks requiring active management (Centre for Social Impact Swinburne et al., 2021). Further, a 2021 survey found that 64% of Australian and New Zealand organisations currently engaged in social procurement did so without clear spending targets, suggesting current models have significant room for improvement in specificity and accountability (Swinburne et al., 2021).

*Social procurement is an underutilised lever capable of creating commercial incentives for disability employment at scale. Its effectiveness is contingent on specific measurable obligations, supply chain accountability, and independent verification, not broad diversity commitments that are unmeasurable in practice.*

#### 4.5 Simplifying pathways for every employer

For disability employment to reach its full potential, it needs to work for small businesses and local organisations as well as large corporates. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) employ the majority of Australians, yet the current system is poorly suited to employers of this size, particularly those that do not have dedicated HR functions. The SME disability employment barrier literature consistently identifies three structural constraints: lack of HR expertise and organisational capacity; fear of accommodation costs and administrative burden; and insufficient knowledge about available support (Nagtegaal et al., 2023; van Berkel, 2025; Keating et al., 2023). These point directly to design requirements and the need for: simplified single-point access, rapid pre-approved adjustment funding, and locally available intermediary support.

The Netherlands is currently trialling a web-based SME Tool providing employers with templates, legal guidance, and communication resources, with a randomised controlled trial underway to test whether simplified digital support increases SME employer capability (Beerda et al., 2024). The design logic, namely that reducing information barriers and compliance anxiety through simplified, accessible guidance increases SME engagement, is directly applicable to the Australian context. Research consistently finds that employers, particularly those without dedicated HR functions, significantly overestimate both the cost and legal complexity of employing people with disability, with fear of legal liability a documented barrier to recruitment decisions (Nagtegaal et al., 2023; Bonaccio et al., 2020; COSBOA, 2022). Plain-language guidance on *Disability Discrimination Act 1992* obligations, co-designed with industry associations, would address the compliance anxiety that leads some employers to avoid candidates who disclose disability at the recruitment stage.

Separately, the EAF's funding mechanism itself also requires reform. Potential options for reform include pre-approved funding pathways for common low-cost adjustments, faster processing targets, and direct supplier payment options for larger modifications. These are all design features that would substantially reduce the cashflow and administrative barriers that currently deter SME uptake, independent of the information barriers the Netherlands trial addresses.

*Simplicity and speed matter more to smaller employers than the quantum of support available. An employer who cannot navigate the system will not use it, however well-resourced it is. Differentiated delivery models for large employers and SMEs, with distinct engagement approaches and support products for each, are likely to reach more of the economy than a single program design.*

### 5. Additional Issues for Consideration

The five reform directions in Section 4 above address the primary employer engagement levers the international evidence supports. However, several additional issues warrant consideration in the design of a comprehensive Australian strategy.

## 5.1 Disability cohort differentiation

People with disability are not a homogeneous population, and the most effective interventions differ substantially across cohorts.

People with *psychosocial* disability respond poorly to time-limited placement programs and benefit most from the Individual Placement and Support (IPS) model, that is, place first, and provide intensive ongoing support thereafter. IPS has the strongest randomised controlled trial (RCT) evidence base of any disability employment intervention for this cohort, with more than 30 RCTs conducted internationally in severe mental illness and psychosocial disability populations (Drake et al., 2023; Suijkerbuijk et al., 2017; Weld-Blundell et al., 2021).

People with *intellectual* disability require long-term supported employment with ongoing job coaching. Research consistently shows that post-placement support is as critical as pre-employment support for this cohort, and that approaches which taper coaching after initial placement produce significantly worse retention outcomes (Carlson et al., 2020; Taubner et al., 2021).

Structured sector-based employment programs for *autistic* people in technical roles have produced positive outcomes in corporate programs at SAP, JPMorgan Chase, Microsoft, and EY, as documented in a University of Washington research project studying these initiatives (Annabi et al., 2019). In the Australian context, Australian Spatial Analytics has pioneered a similar sector-specific model (ASA, 2022). The evidence on what enables these outcomes is clearer: systematic reviews find that sensory and environmental workplace adjustments, structured onboarding processes, and informed supervisory support are consistently associated with better employment acquisition, stability, and productivity for autistic employees (Heinze, 2025; Weber et al., 2024).

Whereas workers with *acquired* disability (whether through illness, injury, or degenerative condition), generally require early intervention within the first six weeks of absence, well before they exit employment and enter the re-employment system (Hoefsmits et al., 2012; Cullen et al., 2018).

A reformed disability employment strategy should, at minimum, segment program design and performance measurement by broad cohort.

## 5.2 Retention and early intervention for workers who acquire disability

Australia's disability employment system is oriented toward getting people into jobs, but disability prevalence rises sharply with age, with only 13% of people with disability report onset before age five and a growing proportion of working-age Australians acquiring disability during employment through illness, injury, or degenerative condition (AIHW, 2025a; BCEC, 2024; AHRC, 2014). The system's placement orientation leaves this cohort, namely people already in work who need retention support, largely outside its design logic.

The international retention evidence points to several approaches with meaningful evidence for this cohort. The Netherlands' *Gatekeeper Improvement Act* (2002) requires employers to continue paying 70% of wages during two years of illness, giving them a direct financial stake in early accommodation and active reintegration (van Ooijen et al., 2024). Graded return to work and part-time sick leave schemes in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Germany allow workers to return at reduced hours with the state covering the income gap, maintaining workplace connection rather than requiring full absence or full attendance (Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 2018; Echarti et al., 2020). How a person's direct manager behaves is consistently the most proximate modifiable retention factor: supervisor training in disability-confident management has moderate evidence of reducing work disability duration (Cullen et al., 2018).

In comparison, Australia lacks an employer financial stake mechanism, a partial sick leave model, and a systematic manager training infrastructure - three structural features for which the international evidence suggests lead to meaningful positive effects on disability-related retention outcomes (Cullen et al., 2018; Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 2018).

### 5.3 Benefit cliff interactions with employment

Workers with disability in Australia frequently face situations where entering or increasing employment reduces the Disability Support Pension (DSP) or other entitlements, sometimes producing net income losses, with the current 50 cent in the dollar income taper rate above the DSP free area being documented as a powerful financial disincentive to open employment (Deloitte Access Economics, 2025; Productivity Commission, 2011). Episodic work capacity, casual employment insecurity, which significantly predicts exit from work among Australians with disability (Milner et al., 2018), and fear of losing benefit eligibility suppress workforce attachment and complicate employer retention efforts, particularly for people with conditions that fluctuate in severity over time (AHRC, 2014).

Reform of disability employment support needs in Australia therefore needs to be designed in coordination with income support policy, particularly for episodic conditions where the ability to work varies week to week. In this context, Norway and Sweden's wage top-up models for episodic workers are worth considering, with the state covering the income gap when a person can only work reduced hours, addressing this directly in a way Australia's current binary system does not (HM Government, 2026).

### 5.4 Portable workplace adjustment records

Another retention failure point is that when employees with disability change roles, teams, or managers, workplace adjustments frequently have to be renegotiated from scratch. Canada's Government of Canada Workplace Accessibility Passport and the UK's Workplace Adjustment Passport address this by recording agreed adjustments and making them portable across role and manager changes (Government of Canada, 2023; Business Disability Forum, 2019). A similar approach, beginning within the APS and potentially extending to the private sector, could reduce a significant friction point in retention.

### 5.5 Evaluation of IEA within its first two years

IEA commenced in November 2025 and no independent outcome data yet exists. An independent (rather than inhouse) evaluation within the first two years, examining provider behaviour toward high-complexity cohorts, employer engagement quality, Centre for Inclusive Employment uptake, and sustained employment rates, would help determine whether the structural design changes are producing different outcomes than the DES program delivered, and would provide a strong and unbiased evidence base to inform any mid-course corrections before the model becomes entrenched.

## 6. Conclusion

Australia already has much of the infrastructure a coherent employer engagement strategy requires. The Employment Assistance Fund, IEA providers, the National Disability Recruitment Coordinator, JobAccess, the Centre for Inclusive Employment, and a growing body of sector pilot experience together represent a genuine foundation. The opportunity is to connect these existing elements more deliberately, resource them more appropriately, and hold them accountable more consistently.

The five reform directions identified in this paper, government leading by example, better harnessing of IEA provider relationships to build employer capability, fostering durable sector compacts, using social procurement as a commercial lever, and simplifying pathways for every employer, are mutually reinforcing and build outward from demonstrated public sector leadership toward a whole-of-economy approach. They do not require new program architecture. They require political will to connect what already exists, evaluate whether it is working, and extend accountability to every level of government and every part of the employer market, so that meaningful disability employment participation becomes the lived experience of more Australians.

### Editorial Note

Artificial intelligence tools were used to assist with literature synthesis, drafting, and editing. The final content, analysis, and conclusions were reviewed and curated by the author.

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